David Adrian, Zakir Durumeric, Pierrick Gaudry, Matthew Green, J. Alex Halderman, Nadia Heninger, Gaëtan Leurent, Drew Springall, Emmanuel Thomé, Luke Valenta, Benjamin VanderSloot, Eric Wustrow
Many thanks to Matthew Green
for his comments on our SMACK paper and his invaluable help in exploiting and disclosing the FREAK attack.
Thanks also to Nadia Heninger who performed the actual factorization attacks on various 512-bit RSA keys. She took the Inria CADO-NFS implementation of the number field sieve algorithm and ran it on Amazon EC2.
Ivan Ristic from the Qualys SSL Labs and the Zmap team provided statistics on websites that enable export cipher suites.
Finally, we thank our contacts at Google (in particular, Adam Langley), Oracle, Apple, OpenSSL, CyaSSL, Akamai, and other vendors for their prompt reaction to the attacks on this page.